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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LANE V. FRANKS: THE SUPREME COURT FRANKLY FAILS TO GO
FAR ENOUGH
INTRODUCTION
The role of the First Amendment in the public workplace is one of high
importance, as nearly twenty-two million Americans are employed by
governmental entities.1 Unlike the broad constitutional protections granted to
private citizen speech, the Supreme Court has constrained public employees’
First Amendment freedoms.2 In June 2014, though, the Supreme Court
unusually, yet unanimously, bolstered the constitutional rights of public
employees by taking an employee-friendly stance in the freedom of speech
realm.3 The Court took cautious steps to define the blurred line established by
its own precedent on what constitutes “citizen speech” protected under the
First Amendment versus constitutionally unprotected “employee speech.”4 In
Lane v. Franks, the focus of this Note, the Supreme Court relaxed the standard
public employee speech was previously held to, and it reinforced the
importance of compelled testimony by ever-so-slightly expanding First
Amendment protection to public employees testifying under subpoena about
matters not within their ordinary job duties;5 however, the decision did not go
quite far enough.
While Lane v. Franks first appeared to be a victory for public employees,
the decision certainly has its drawbacks. The decision effectually left lower
courts in the dark,6 and both public employees and employers confused on the
boundaries of constitutional protection.7 While Lane v. Franks tried to redefine
ambiguous precedent, it failed to do so clearly and effectively. Moreover, the
Court’s narrow holding leaves too many types of speech unprotected, such as
1. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT & PAYROLL
SUMMARY REPORT: 2013 2 (2014), http://www2.census.gov/govs/apes/2013_summary_report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/63F4-T93U].
2. W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 313
(2001).
3. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2014).
4. Id. at 2378–80.
5. See id.
6. Catherine Fisk, Guest Blog: Catherine Fisk on Lane v. Franks, HAMILTON AND GRIFFIN
ON RIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2014), http://hamilton-griffin.com/guest-blog-catherine-fisk-on-lane-vfranks/ [http://perma.cc/5PM6-QGC4].
7. Katie Jo Baumgardner, Note, Lane v. Franks, 90 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. ONLINE 42, 52
(2015).
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voluntary testimony and speech that falls within the course of one’s ordinary
job duties.8 A citizen’s First Amendment protections should not have to be
checked at the door merely because he or she is employed by a state actor, and
public employees should be further protected from potential retaliation.
Part I of this Note discusses the applicable portions of the Constitution and
Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence that laid the foundation for the
Lane decision. Part II discusses the circuit split that existed concerning the
constitutional protections of public employee testimony before the Supreme
Court’s attempt at resolution in 2014. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lane v. Franks, the predominate focus of this Note. Part IV
provides a critique of the Court’s decision in Lane. Finally, Part V proposes a
modified, and preferable, test for the Court to employ in determining whether a
public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected.
I. THE FIRST ATTEMPTS AT DRAWING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINE BETWEEN
CITIZEN SPEECH AND EMPLOYEE SPEECH
A.

Constitutional and Statutory Freedom of Speech Protections

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”9 The First
Amendment limits the government, and its entities, from regulating the speech
of its citizens.10 However, while the First Amendment is a fundamental right
and is considered one of our nation’s most prized values,11 the right is not
absolute, and there are abundant types of speech that escape the provision’s
scope.12 One notable exception is the one granted to public employees. While
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence grants public employees
some protection, “their speech is afforded a lower degree of constitutional
protection as compared with the speech of private citizens.”13 These narrowed
rights become particularly controversial when, because of their speech, an
employee faces adverse employment consequences or termination.14

8. See infra Part IV.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See id.
11. E.g., SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1212 (N.Y. 1985) (“[T]he
right to free expression is one of this Nation’s most cherished civil liberties.”).
12. Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom—the Roberts Court, the First Amendment,
and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 417–18 (2013) (listing examples of exceptions,
such as speech used to further a criminal conspiracy, speech that amounts to treason, defamation
or libelous speech, and speech that is deemed obscene).
13. Wendel, supra note 2, at 344.
14. See David L. Hudson Jr., Balancing Act: Public Employees and Free Speech, 3 FIRST
REPS. 1, 4 (2002). In response to retaliation, many public employees seek redress under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which in itself contains no rights but provides a private cause of action for citizens
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Key Cases Outlining Supreme Court First Amendment Jurisprudence

For many years, “the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had
no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—
including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.”15
However, in 1968, that officially changed when the Supreme Court decided
Pickering v. Board of Education.16 In Pickering, the Court recognized that
public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason
of their employment.17 Rather, the First Amendment protection of a public
employee’s speech depends on a careful balance between the interests of the
employee as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern, and the
interests of the State as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.18
In Pickering, the plaintiff was a public school teacher whose employment
was terminated when he wrote a letter to the editor of a local newspaper
criticizing the school board’s proposed funding plans.19 The Supreme Court
concluded the public school teacher’s speech was constitutionally protected
under the First Amendment by way of the newly created “Pickering balancing
test.”20 Under the test, two inquiries are made.21 First, courts must ascertain
whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, which
is a two-pronged inquiry.22 The first question serves as merely a threshold. If
the threshold is not satisfied, the analysis ends, and the speech is not afforded
First Amendment protection.23 However, if the threshold is met, and the
employee did speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the analysis

deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution,” such as the First
Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
15. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983). Up until the middle of the twentieth
century, there was no constitutional bar to a governmental employer prohibiting speech
considered detrimental to the employer’s best interests. See generally id.; Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375, 395 (1962) (finding county sheriff’s letter criticizing a local judge’s ruling was
protected expression because it “did not present a danger to the administration of justice”).
16. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 565 (1968).
17. Id. at 568; see also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (reiterating
public employees cannot be constitutionally forced to surrender First Amendment rights afforded
to all citizens based on their employment).
18. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (This balance takes into account
the First Amendment’s primary goal: the full protection of speech involving matters of public
concern as well as the “practical realities involved in the administration of a government office”).
19. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
20. Id. at 568.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006); Connick, 461 U.S. at 144–
48 (exemplifying the dual inquiry Pickering balancing test).
23. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

296

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:293

proceeds to the second inquiry: the balancing test. The Court then determined
whether the government employer had an adequate justification for treating the
employee differently than any other member of the general public,24 weighing
the employee’s interest against the employer’s interest. Under the Pickering
balancing test, so long as the employee is speaking as a citizen about matters of
public concern, only restrictions that are necessary for the employer to operate
efficiently and effectively, and avoid disruption, are permitted.25
While an individual has obvious constitutional rights and interests in one’s
speech, the government also has important interests at stake. The government
as a sovereign has few legitimate reasons to regulate speech,26 but the
government as an employer has a multitude of reasons to do so. When
functioning as an employer, the government has the same interests as all other
employers,27 such as the maintenance of harmony in the workplace, the
maintenance of discipline, the need for employee loyalty, and the need for an
employee to keep confidences.28 These governmental interests make even
more sense in consideration of the overall public interest because the public
has a strong interest in the services the government provides. Therefore, the
public aligns with the government when the government is acting as an
employer and the speech at issue would disrupt those services. The interplay of
these interests (that of the employee, the employer, and the public) explains
why the Court’s framework began evolving with the institution of a balancing
test under Pickering.
While Pickering left some matters unclear, such as the definition of a
citizen speaking on a matter of public concern and its application of the
analytical framework on workplace speech,29 the Supreme Court handed down
several other cases in the coming years to provide clarification. Givhan v.
Western Line Consolidated School District defined the First Amendment
protection to private conversations involving a matter of public concern.30 The

24. Id.
25. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. Since the letter to the editor concerning the school budget
constituted speech on a matter of public concern, and it did not impede the teacher’s proper
performance of his daily duties in the classroom or interfere with the regular operation of the
schools, the teacher’s speech alone could not serve as the basis for termination. Id. at 572–73.
26. When the government is sovereign, the public interest dictates that speech be allowed
unless it is truly dangerous. For example, screaming “fire” in a crowded movie theatre.
27. Public Employer May Remove Employees Acting in Direct Contravention of Employer’s
Interests, 2 NO. 10 NEV. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (July 1997).
28. See generally Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 909 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing various
interests of the government functioning as an employer).
29. See id. at 574.
30. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (finding a school
teacher’s grievance on discriminatory policies to her supervisor in private was speaking as a
citizen on a matter of public concern and deserving of First Amendment protection); see also

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2016] LANE V. FRANKS: THE SUPREME COURT FRANKLY FAILS TO GO FAR ENOUGH

297

Court made it apparent that speech not directly related to an employee’s
ordinary work responsibilities would likely be protected.31 However, in
Connick v. Myers, the Court looked to the content, form, and context of the
speech to determine whether the speech was considered a matter of public
concern.32 There, the Court was faced with a matter that pertained directly to
the employee’s job duties, and it hinted that government employees speaking
directly about their employment may receive different treatment.33 Connick
indicated that if the content involves a larger audience, possibly outside the
workplace, the speech is more likely to be protected.34 If the speech appears
more like a disgruntled employee complaining about personal employment
issues, the less likely the speech will be protected.35 Despite some
clarifications by the Court, the precise definition of “speech involving a matter
of public concern” continued to remain unclear for decades to come.
After nearly forty years of faithfully applying the Pickering balancing test,
the Supreme Court issued a sharply divided opinion and added a new, and
significant, wrinkle to the analysis.36 In Garcetti, a district attorney claimed
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment when he was reassigned for
writing a memorandum recommending a case be dismissed after uncovering
alleged governmental misconduct surrounding a search warrant.37 While
regarding Pickering as a “useful starting point,”38 Garcetti v. Ceballos added
an additional threshold inquiry by distinguishing between government
employees speaking as members of the public and government employees
speaking while performing their official job duties.39 In effect, the Court
usurped the previously undefined “as a citizen” language from Pickering and
provided it with separate analytical teeth. The Court held if the speech is made
“pursuant to” the public employee’s “official duties,” then the employee was
not speaking as a citizen, and Garcetti’s new threshold inquiry is left
unsatisfied.40 The consequence is that the employee’s speech is left
unprotected, even if the employee can satisfy the previously established

Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384, 388–89 (1987) (deeming an employee’s comment
regarding the attempted assassination of President Nixon to be citizen speech).
31. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415–16.
32. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
33. Id. However, the Court did not expressly reach whether the employee’s speech
constituted citizen speech, as it was resolved based on the speech not constituting “a matter of
public concern.” Id.
34. See id. at 147.
35. See id.
36. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
37. Id. at 414–15.
38. Id. at 417.
39. Id. at 421.
40. Id.
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Pickering balancing test.41 Thus, after Garcetti, even if the speech is an
expression of public concern the employee held in his or her capacity as a
private citizen, if it is voiced pursuant to the employee’s official duties, the
First Amendment no longer provides a safeguard from employer discipline.42
This has since been referred to as the “official duties” doctrine.43 The Garcetti
Court granted public employers substantial discretion in running their
respective services, and it reasoned that when a citizen accepts a government
employment position, the citizen by necessity also accepts some restraints on
his or her freedoms in order to maintain proper functioning of government
offices.44
Under this newly created “official duties” doctrine, the Garcetti Court
identified whether the statements were actually made pursuant to the
employee’s official job responsibilities as the “controlling factor.”45 Since the
district attorney prepared the memorandum at issue while performing the tasks
he was compensated to perform, the Court determined his statement was made
as a public employee pursuant to his official duties.46 Therefore, he was
speaking as an employee, not as a citizen, and the First Amendment did not
insulate him from discipline.47
The Garcetti decision created strong division across the Court. Indeed, the
majority opinion, which was joined by only five justices, was countered with
three dissenting opinions.48 Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer
all contended that the majority’s holding went too far in setting forth a per se
rule and provided the employer with too much protection at the expense of the
employee’s constitutional rights.49 Alternatively, Justice Stevens asserted that
“[t]he proper answer to the question ‘whether the First Amendment protects a

41. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
42. Id.
43. See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).
44. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 421–22 (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant
to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline . . . .
Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities
does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply
reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or
created.”).
45. Id. at 421.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 422.
48. Id. at 412, 426, 427, 444.
49. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426, 446 (Stevens, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at
428–29 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[A] government paycheck does nothing to eliminate the value to
an individual of speaking on public matters, and there is no good reason for categorically
discounting a speaker’s interest in commenting on a matter of public concern just because the
government employs him.”).
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government employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the
employee’s official duties’ . . . is ‘[s]ometimes,’ not ‘[n]ever.’”50 The dissents
also emphasized that there is not a categorical difference between citizen
speech and employee speech, and constitutional protection should not hinge on
such an arbitrary distinction.51 It was evident the Garcetti Court could not
present a united front, which likely contributed to the confusion concerning
how to apply the new standard and a subsequent split among the circuits.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IN NEED OF RESOLUTION
In the years following the Garcetti decision, many lower courts struggled
with its application.52 It has proven difficult to determine whether speech falls
within an employee’s official duties and is left unprotected, or if the speech is
otherwise subject to the First Amendment.53
One activity that has proven particularly problematic in application is a
public employee’s in-court testimony.54 On this issue, the circuit courts have
interpreted Supreme Court precedent differently.55 The Third Circuit took the
position that any subpoenaed testimony offered in court, even if it relates to an
investigation conducted as part of an employee’s official duties, is protected
speech because “[w]hen a government employee testifies truthfully, s/he is not
‘simply performing his or her job duties;’ rather, the employee is acting as a
citizen and is bound by the dictates of the court and the rules of evidence.”56
The Third Circuit extended this protection further to include voluntary
testimony as a way to check potential retaliation for truthful testimony and in

50. Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 427, 430.
52. Fisk, supra note 6.
53. See Looney v. Black, 702 F.3d 701, 718 (2d Cir. 2012) (“To determine whether speech
was made ‘pursuant to’ one’s official job duties, it is necessary to ascertain whether the speech at
issue ‘owed its existence to [the plaintiff’s] job duties and was made in furtherance of those
duties.’”); Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Our Court has explained that,
even if a public employee’s speech ‘is not required by, or included in, [his] job description, or
[made] in response to a request by the employer,’ he speaks as an employee and not as a citizen if
the speech is ‘part-and-parcel of his concerns’ about his ability to ‘properly execute his duties.’”);
Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e must ask whether the speech
is part of the employee’s ‘daily professional activities.’”).
54. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014).
55. See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008); Chrzanowski, 725
F.3d at 736; Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 712 (11th Cir. 2013). But see
Fisk, supra note 6 (“The Eleventh Circuit is alone among the circuits in holding that an employee
can be fired for testifying truthfully pursuant to a subpoena.”).
56. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231 (internal citation omitted). A police officer testifying for the
prosecution in a police corruption case received First Amendment protection because every
citizen, including government employees, has a duty to comply with the rule of law and to testify
truthfully in court proceedings. Id. at 224, 231.
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order to preserve the truth-seeking process.57 The Seventh Circuit took a
similar approach, finding testimony of a public employee against his
supervisor in a criminal proceeding protected as First Amendment speech.58
The Seventh Circuit first applied the “official duties” doctrine of Garcetti and
the Pickering balance test, but it further found the employee’s speech deserved
constitutional protection whether it was part of an employee’s duties or not.59
Other circuits have considered whether the courtroom testimony of a
public employee is protected under the First Amendment without going
beyond a strict application of the “official duties” doctrine of Garcetti and the
Pickering balancing test. The Ninth Circuit held testimony of a domestic
violence counselor was protected under the First Amendment because the
counselor was not directed to testify by the employer, but rather was
subpoenaed and testified to a matter of public concern.60 Similarly, the Second
Circuit held in-court testimony offered by a Department of Social Services
employee was not protected speech because the employee was not subpoenaed
but voluntarily testified about information she obtained through performing her
official employee duties.61 Additionally, the employee identified herself as
such, and she failed to “distinguish her personal views from those of [her
employer].”62
Ultimately, the various district and appellate courts were struggling with
what exactly it means to speak pursuant to one’s employment. Does it mean
that the act of speaking in this precise form is required by one’s job? Does it
mean speaking about things related to one’s workplace? Does it mean speaking
about things one learns through one’s work? The varied applications of
Garcetti and Pickering in courts throughout the country led to discrepancies in

57. Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 886–87 (3d Cir. 1997).
58. Chrzanowski, 725 F.3d at 736; see also Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir.
2007).
59. Chrzanowski, 725 F.3d at 740–41. The court found testimony given pursuant to a
subpoena is protected because the rationale behind the Garcetti “official duties” doctrine would
not be properly served by allowing an employer to affect the testimony of an employee under
oath. Id.
60. Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1104–06 (9th Cir. 2011). The court
also considered that the counselor was testifying about someone other than a patient he treated,
and the only evidence in the record of the counselor’s job duties was his job description, which
included nothing about testifying in court. Id.
61. Kiehle v. Cty. of Cortland, 486 F. App’x 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Bearss v.
Wilton, 445 F. App’x 400, 403–04 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding testimony of a public employee was
unprotected because the employee’s testimony concerned her job performance and “[was]
motivated by personal interest in responding to criticism of her job performance and [was] not
motivated by a desire to ‘advance a public purpose,’” and thus fell within the employee’s official
duties).
62. Kiehle, 486 F. App’x at 224.
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both holdings and reasoning, practically begging the Supreme Court to provide
clarification.
III. LANE V. FRANKS
A.

Facts of Lane v. Franks

Faced with pronounced division among the circuits, the Supreme Court
confronted the issue of whether the First Amendment protects a public
employee offering compelled court testimony in Lane v. Franks.63 The case
concerns Petitioner Edward Lane (“Lane”) who served as the director of
Central Alabama Community College’s (CACC) Community Intensive
Training for Youth (CITY) Program, a statewide program for underprivileged
youth.64 While conducting an audit of the program’s finances, Lane learned
Suzanne Schmitz (“Schmitz”), an Alabama state representative, was on the
program’s payroll but did not regularly report to work or perform any external
work for the program.65 After internally raising his concerns to his superiors,
Lane attempted to rectify the situation by confronting Schmitz who refused to
comply and continued to be absent from CACC’s offices.66 Lane then
unilaterally terminated Schmitz’s employment with CACC, ignoring warnings
from both CACC’s attorney and president, Steve Franks (“Franks”), that doing
so could involve negative repercussions for both Lane and the school.67
Shortly thereafter, the FBI began investigating Schmitz’s employment with
CITY and contacted Lane for information to aid their investigation.68 Pursuant
to subpoena, Lane testified on behalf of the prosecution in Schmitz’s case
before a grand jury in 2006 and then again at a federal criminal trial in 2008,69
relating to charges that included mail fraud and fraud involving a program
receiving federal funds.70 Lane testified to the circumstances and events that
precipitated his termination of Schmitz in the grand jury proceedings and both
criminal trials.71 This information consisted predominantly of information

63. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014).
64. Id. at 2375.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375.
69. Id. at 2375–76. Lane also testified at the second criminal trial of Schmitz in February
2009, when she was retried after the first jury failed to reach a verdict. This testimony came after
his termination from CITY, which occurred in January 2009. Id.
70. Id. at 2375; see also United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2011)
(alleging Schmitz had collected $177,251.82 in federal funds despite performing “little or no
work for the program, generat[ing] virtually no services or work product, and rarely even
appear[ing] for work . . . .”).
71. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375.
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Lane obtained through the audit he conducted in his official capacity as
CITY’s director.72
Just a few months after the conclusion of the first trial, Lane was fired by
CACC.73 In 2011, Lane commenced an action in response to his termination
against CACC and Franks, alleging he was improperly retaliated against in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on his testimony before the grand jury,
which he contended constituted speech protected by the First Amendment.74
B.

Procedural Posture

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
granted Franks’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified
immunity.75 The district court relied on Garcetti, which held that “when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,” in determining Lane’s
speech was not protected by the First Amendment, and thus there was no
viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.76 The district court stated that since Lane
obtained the information he testified about in his capacity as the director of
CITY, his speech was considered part of his official duties and was not speech
made as a citizen involving a public concern.77
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling after
finding no reversible error,78 and also relying extensively on Garcetti.79 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded Lane testified as an employee, and not as a citizen,
because his testimony concerned his investigation of the termination of
Schmitz, which occurred while he was acting pursuant to his official job
responsibilities.80 Relying on its own precedent, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated
that even if the speech (the subpoenaed testimony) itself was not part of the
employee’s official duties, Lane is left unprotected by the First Amendment if
the speech “‘owes its existence to [the] employee’s professional
responsibilities’ and is ‘a product that the employer itself has commissioned or

72. Id.
73. Id. at 2376. The president of CACC, Steve Franks, initially laid off twenty-nine
employees with three years of service or less, including Lane, to accommodate budget shortfalls.
However, Franks rescinded all but two of the terminations just days later, one of which was
Lane’s. Id.
74. Id.
75. Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., No. CV-11-BE-0883-M, 2012 WL 5289412, at *12
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 18, 2012).
76. Id. at *10 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).
77. Id.
78. Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 710 (11th Cir. 2013).
79. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376.
80. Lane, 523 F. App’x at 712.
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created.’”81 Therefore, the fact that “Lane testified about his official activities
pursuant to a subpoena and in the litigation context, in and of itself, does not
bring Lane’s speech within the protection of the First Amendment.”82 Nor did
the court find relevant that Lane’s job description did not include testifying at
criminal trials, finding the most pertinent fact to be that his testimony only
touched on acts he performed in his official capacity as CITY’s director.83
Lane then appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari84 to “resolve
discord” among the circuits as to whether a public employee may be
terminated for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of
their ordinary job duties.85
C. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court overwhelmingly disagreed with the lower courts on
the First Amendment issue, holding a public employee who, outside the course
of his ordinary job responsibilities, provides truthful testimony at trial pursuant
to a subpoena is protected by the First Amendment from employer discipline.86
Justice Sotomayor, writing the majority opinion for a unanimous Court,
initially set out the basics of public employee free speech jurisprudence.87
“[C]itizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by accepting public
employment.”88 Rather, the protection depends on the balance between the
employee and employer’s interests, as set forth in Pickering.89
The Lane Court added its voice to the existing Pickering and Garcetti
frameworks governing public employee speech. The first inquiry, whether the
speech in question––here, Lane’s compelled testimony––is speech as a citizen
on a matter of public concern, remained largely the same.90 However, whether
the speech is “pursuant to” the employee’s ordinary job duties was further
defined than it had been previously in Garcetti. Seemingly without hesitation,
the Court declared that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee

81. Id. at 711 (quoting Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009)).
82. Id. at 712.
83. Id. While Lane’s speech was not part of his regular duties, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned
it was based on activities he engaged in within the scope of his official responsibilities as director
of CITY, excluding it from the purview of citizen speech. Id.
84. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2374–75, 2379. However, despite finding Lane is entitled to First Amendment
protection, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts based on the existence of qualified
immunity for Franks in his individual capacity. Id. at 2383.
87. Id. at 2377–79.
88. Id. at 2374.
89. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2374.
90. Id. at 2378. As did the final inquiry concerning whether the government could present
any countervailing interest to tip the scale in its favor. Id. at 2380–81.
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outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First
Amendment purposes,” even when the testimony concerns his public
employment or information obtained during that employment.91
1.

Citizen Speech or Employee Speech

The Supreme Court limited the reach of Garcetti’s “pursuant to” standard
by asking instead whether the speech “is itself ordinarily within the scope of an
employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”92 Specifically,
the Court articulated the speech compelled by subpoena certainly was not
within Lane’s ordinary job duties as a program supervisor, and it instead
qualified as citizen speech.93 In finding to the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit
improperly ignored the fact that sworn testimony is the “quintessential
example” of citizen speech since “[a]nyone who testifies in court bears an
obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.”94 Anyone
testifying, including a public employee, has an independent obligation to be
truthful, rendering sworn testimony speech as a citizen, distinct from speech
made purely in the capacity as a public employee.95
Furthermore, the Court criticized the Eleventh Circuit for improperly
interpreting Garcetti too broadly in concluding Lane did not speak as a citizen,
and instead as a government employee, when testifying.96 The mere fact that
Lane learned of the subject matter of the proffered testimony in the course of
his employment with CACC does not require the speech be treated as
employee speech rather than citizen speech.97 Garcetti said absolutely nothing
to that effect.98 Garcetti’s critical inquiry is whether the speech is within the
scope of, or required as part of, an employee’s ordinary duties, not whether it
merely concerns those duties or whether the subject matter of the speech was
discovered in the course of those duties.99 A public employee’s speech, which
just “relates to” his or her job, or is based on “information learned” in the
course of fulfilling one’s job, is within the scope of First Amendment
protection so long as it involves a matter of public concern.100 Therefore, even
though Lane acquired the information he testified to throughout the course of

91. Id. at 2378.
92. Id. at 2379.
93. Id. at 2378–79.
94. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379; see Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 712
(11th Cir. 2013) (finding it immaterial that Lane spoke “pursuant to a subpoena and in the
litigation context”).
95. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378–80.
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his employment, his official duties did not include providing sworn testimony,
and his testimony thus should appropriately be characterized as citizen
speech.101
The Supreme Court went on to reiterate the important policy
considerations behind its decision.102 There is a “special value” held by speech
of public employees relating to their employment because those employees
have inside knowledge on matters of public concern.103 Based on their inside
acquisition of information, “it is essential that [public employees] be able to
speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”104
Moreover, the Court recognizes the heightened importance in this context:
public corruption.105
It would be antithetical to our jurisprudence to conclude that the very kind of
speech necessary to prosecute corruption by public officials––speech by public
employees regarding information learned through their employment––may
never form the basis for a First Amendment retaliation claim. Such a rule
would place public employees who witness corruption in an impossible
position, torn between the obligation to testify truthfully and the desire to
106
avoid retaliation and keep their jobs.

Therefore, in light of these important judicial principles, it is apparent that
Lane’s sworn testimony qualifies as citizen speech and not as employee speech
within the ordinary course of his job description.107
2.

Matter of Public Concern

The second inquiry performed by the Court was whether the speech dealt
with a matter of public concern.108 Speech incorporates public concern when it
relates “to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community”
or is “a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.”109
Lane’s testimony involved the malfeasance of a state legislator in connection
with the misuse of public funds.110 Since this was a classic case of
whistleblowing about public corruption, the testimony was surely a matter of

101. Id.
102. See id. at 2379–80.
103. Id. at 2379.
104. Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 572
(1968)); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543
U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (observing many categories of public employees “are uniquely qualified to
comment” on “matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public at large”).
105. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2380.
109. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011)).
110. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375.
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public concern.111 Additionally, the inquiry relies on the “‘content, form, and
context’ of the speech.”112 Since the form and context of the speech was sworn
testimony in a judicial proceeding, the Court’s conclusion that the speech
involved a public concern was bolstered.113
3.

Adequate Governmental Justification

However, Lane’s testimony is not categorically entitled to protection under
the First Amendment merely because it is citizen speech on a matter of public
concern.114 The final question is whether the government provided “‘an
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other
member of the public.’”115 While government employers often have legitimate
interests, including promoting efficiency and integrity, and maintaining proper
discipline, the showing of a stronger interest may be required if the employee’s
speech involves a substantial matter of public concern.116 Here, the defendants
never seriously argued that the balance should tip in their favor.117
Subsequently, there was no arguable countervailing governmental interest
whatsoever that would justify Lane’s firing.118 Due to the total lack of a
governmental interest in this case, the Court held Lane’s speech was entitled to
First Amendment protection.119
D. Concurrence Places Limitations on Majority’s Holding
However, the concurring opinion authored by Justice Thomas, and joined
by Justice Scalia and Justice Alito, rationalized that the answer to the question
presented, whether a public employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public
concern when testifying under oath outside the scope of his or her ordinary job
responsibilities, requires merely a straightforward application of Garcetti.120
Justice Thomas explained that, under Garcetti, “when a public employee
speaks ‘pursuant to’ his official duties, he is not speaking ‘as a citizen,’ and

111. Id. at 2380; see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (stating public
employees are uniquely qualified to comment on matters concerning governmental policies that
are of interest to the public at large).
112. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)).
116. Id. at 2381.
117. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381 (stating respondents did not even attempt to assert Lane’s
testimony was erroneous, or that confidential or privileged information was unnecessarily
disclosed in the testimony).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2383 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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First Amendment protection is unavailable.”121 Here, the concurrence argues
by deduction that Lane spoke as a citizen, and not as an employee, because he
did not testify as part of an employment responsibility, as his job duties did not
include testifying in court proceedings.122 The concurrence goes to great
lengths to reiterate that this holding only applies to factual situations in which
the testimony provided by the employee is not pursuant to the employee’s
direct job duties.123 Therefore, the Court leaves the important question
unresolved of whether a public employee speaking within the scope of his or
her job description, as is so commonly required of lab technicians, police
officers, and investigators, is afforded similar constitutional protection.124
IV. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS: LANE FALLS SHORT
A.

The Holding Ultimately Gets It Right

Before addressing the abundant shortcomings of the Court’s opinion in
Lane v. Franks, it is important to address its achievements. In a rare unanimous
decision expanding an employee’s constitutional rights,125 the Court correctly
laid down protection for employees abiding by a citizen duty of utmost
importance: providing truthful testimony under subpoena.126 Almost every
justice, including Justice Kennedy, the author of Garcetti,127 seemed deeply
troubled by the idea that a government employee subpoenaed to testify is faced
with three choices: refuse to testify and be held in contempt, testify falsely and
commit perjury, or testify truthfully and be terminated.128 By resolving this
dispute in favor of Lane, the Court rightly sends an important message that we,
as a nation, highly value testimony given in a court of law.129 The majority
opinion even goes to great lengths to explicitly relay this policy.130
The holding is also sufficiently narrow and confined that it manages to
protect subpoenaed public employees without imposing any additional burden
on government employers. This is because while the Court is correct in
recognizing the value of unfettered, truthful testimony in court proceedings,

121. Id.
122. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2383.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2384. Likewise, through implication by silence, the Court also leaves unresolved
the constitutional protection given to those who voluntary provide testimony versus those who
testify under subpoena.
125. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Supreme Court’s 2013-2014 Labor and Employment Law
Decisions: Consensus at the Court, 18 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 159, 176 (2014).
126. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378.
127. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 412 (2006).
128. Fisk, supra note 6.
129. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378–80.
130. Id. at 2380.
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this result required little more than an application of Garcetti v. Ceballos.131
Lane testified in a manner that was neither pursuant to his job duties nor done
to fulfill a work responsibility. The Eleventh Circuit misconstrued Garcetti’s
“pursuant to” standard to broadly include anything that was uncovered through
the employee’s line of work when finding Lane’s testimony unprotected.132
Since Lane’s ordinary job duties did not include testifying at criminal trials, he
spoke “as a citizen” and was entitled to constitutional protection from
discipline, even under the Garcetti standard.133 Therefore, while regarded as a
major achievement for public employees,134 the Court did little more than
apply its own precedent.
B.

The Court’s Reasoning Was Largely Incomplete and Unfounded

Lane v. Franks was the first chance for the Supreme Court to confront
many of the unresolved questions following Garcetti v. Ceballos. However,
while Lane v. Franks clarifies a few contours and boundaries of Garcetti’s
holding, the Supreme Court left many important questions unanswered. Lane
reiterates a public employer cannot discipline an employee for providing
“truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the scope of his
ordinary job responsibilities,”135 but the Court fails to clear up other
ambiguities of its own precedent, instead electing to leave those issues for a
later date.136 In this regard, the Court missed a significant opportunity to
minimize confusion and uncertainty by refusing to overturn Garcetti’s
formalistic distinction between public employees speaking as either employees
or citizens, ignoring the issue of whether voluntary testimony qualifies for First
Amendment protection, and declining to explicitly define what is considered
unprotected testimony within an employee’s job description. By not choosing
to resolve so many existing discrepancies and leaving the current doctrine in a
state of many interpretations, the Lane decision has left lower courts
confounded. The decision further leaves government entities holding their
breath by not providing notice of what conduct specifically goes awry of the
Constitution, and it leaves employees in fear that speaking out will cost them
their jobs.137 Therefore, even though the Court correctly extended protection to
Lane, it still ultimately dropped the ball.
131. See id. at 2383 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating the decision reached “require[d] little
more than a straightforward application of Garcetti”).
132. Id. at 2379.
133. Id. at 2380.
134. See Press Release, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, SEIU’s Henry Comments on Supreme Court
Ruling in Lane v. Franks (June 19, 2014), http://www.seiu.org/2014/06/seius-henry-commentson-supreme-court-ruling-in-la [http://perma.cc/5MEL-5NW7].
135. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378.
136. See id. at 2383–84 (Thomas, J., concurring).
137. See generally Baumgardner, supra note 7, at 52.
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The Boundaries of an Employee’s “Ordinary Job Duties” Are Left
Unresolved

The Lane opinion did not address whether the First Amendment should
protect the truthful testimony of a public employee where the testimony is
included in the employee’s ordinary job duties. The majority opinion failed to
acknowledge this explicitly, but the concurrence ensured to expressly reiterate
that this is a question “for another day.”138 However, based on the policy
rationales advanced by the Court, First Amendment application should not be
precluded even when the testimony is part of the employee’s ordinary job
duties because the obligation to testify truthfully arises from his or her status as
a citizen.139
The Lane Court made clear that providing “[s]worn testimony in judicial
proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen . . . .”140 Why,
then, should a police officer or crime scene technician141 be treated differently
when they have the same “obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell
the truth[?]”142 There is no significant distinction between Lane’s testimony
and testimony provided to fulfill a job responsibility.143 Extending the
protection beyond mere “speech as a citizen,” and instead protecting all
truthful testimony, continues to meaningfully protect sworn testimony.144
Furthermore, the obligation to be truthful remains. “[T]he government
employer’s interest in hiring and firing does not outweigh the need for [public
employees] to offer truthful sworn testimony without fear of repercussion.”145
Most importantly, public employees who testify as a critical part of their
employment duties should not be fearful that they could be terminated or
retaliated against for providing truthful sworn testimony. Promoting such a
policy is deeply troubling.

138. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“We accordingly have no occasion to
address the quite different question whether a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen’ when he
testifies in the course of his ordinary job responsibilities . . . The Court properly leaves [these]
constitutional questions . . . for another day.”).
139. Id. at 2378–79.
140. Id. at 2379.
141. Id. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring). These are examples provided by the concurrence as
public employees who regularly testify within their ordinary job duties. Id. at 2383 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
142. Id. at 2379 (“That obligation is distinct and independent from any separate obligations a
testifying public employee might have to his employer.”).
143. Baumgardner, supra note 7, at 51; see also Garcetti v. Caeballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427
(2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is senseless to let constitutional protection for exactly the
same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description.”).
144. Baumgardner, supra note 7, at 51.
145. Id. at 52.
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Additionally, job duties can be construed very broadly, giving public
employers the potential power to construe employees’ job duties to include
testifying to gain control over their speech.146 In addition to this concern, job
responsibilities are ever-changing. Public employees should not have to guess
whether something they express that is a matter of public importance will be
considered “pursuant to” their “ordinary job duties”––and thus left unprotected
by current First Amendment jurisprudence––or will instead be deemed to just
“relate[] to” their job duties or be based on “information learned” within the
course of their employment—and thus be constitutionally protected.147 This is
a complex inquiry, one that is leaving lower courts and experts confounded,
and that should not need to be performed by every public employee before
testifying.
The most viable argument that public employees should not be protected
when testifying pursuant to their official duties is to avoid burdening local
governments.148 However, is categorically infringing upon a public employee’s
constitutional rights warranted solely to avoid placing a slight burden on
government?149 A Supreme Court ruling that the First Amendment covers
public employees when subpoenaed to testify, regardless of the testimony’s
nature or its inclusion in their ordinary job duties, would undoubtedly protect
public employees from retaliation from their employers.150 While this blanket
constitutional coverage could also restrict a public employer’s ability to control
its employee’s speech,151 it would make great strides in advancing the
principles we, as a nation, value most: truthful testimony and constitutional
rights. The Court places such heavy emphasis on the importance of protecting
testimony but then proceeds to leave testimony within a public employee’s
ordinary job duties subject to infringement. This differentiation should not
exist. Further, the government could be protected in anomalous situations in
which the employee’s testimony does unduly interfere with its interests as an
employer through the final step of the inquiry: the balancing test.152

146. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
147. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378.
148. Brief for the International Municipal Lawyers Association, Inc. and the International
Public Management Association for Human Resources as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
Steve Franks at 4, Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (No. 13-483).
149. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150. Michael Lorden, Lane v. Franks: Public Employee Testimony and the First Amendment,
LOYOLA U. CHI. EDUC. L. & POL’Y INST. F. 1, 10 (2014), http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/
centers/childlaw/childed/pdfs/2014studentpapers/Lorden.pdf [http://perma.cc/MJ75-6T7T].
151. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (stating “government offices could not
function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter”).
152. The balancing test is utilized in Pickering as well as the final inquiry in Lane. Pickering
v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380–
81.
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The Distinction Between Speech as a Public Employee and Citizen
Speech Is Undefined and Ambiguous

Like distinguishing between speech in the ordinary course of one’s job
duties and outside of one’s job duties, the distinction created between citizen
speech and public employee speech makes little sense. “The notion that there is
a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the
course of one’s employment is quite wrong.”153 A citizen employed by the
government is nonetheless a citizen,154 and that citizenship should be placed
first, over the secondary identification as a public employee. Cashing a
government paycheck is an inadequate justification to discount a speaker’s
interest in commenting on a matter of public concern, and the First
Amendment rests on something more.155
The Supreme Court has even professed having the responsibility of
ensuring “citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working
for the government.”156 However, the Court is failing in upholding that
responsibility to the citizens of our country who happen to be public
employees. By limiting constitutional protections of public employees that are
to be provided to all citizens, the Court is effectively depriving over twentytwo million citizens of their fundamental right to free speech. Overall, the
premise that a person could be speaking as a citizen in one regard, and as an
employee in another, is a total fallacy. In order to restore all constitutional
protections to public employees, the fantasy-based distinction between citizen
speech and employee speech should also be entirely discarded.
3.

Voluntary Testimony Should Also Be Afforded First Amendment
Protection

So long as the testimony provided is truthful and not misleading, the First
Amendment should bar employer discipline even in instances of voluntary
testimony. While the employer certainly has an interest in controlling the
information released by its employees, First Amendment protection should
transcend merely subpoenaed testimony and also extend to testimony that is
voluntarily provided. The policy rationales advanced by the Court on the
importance of testimony157 apply whether the testimony provided is compelled
or uncompelled.
Public employees who witness corruption or possess valuable information
obtained through their employment should be able to testify voluntarily
without being hampered by fear of employment consequences. “[T]ruthful
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 428–29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
See supra Part IV(B)(1) for an explanation of the Court’s policy on protecting testimony.
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speech is at the apex of the constitutional safeguard; [and] truthful speech
about matters of public concern and the conduct of public officials [should be]
especially protected; and that truthful testimony in court, in particular, may not
serve as the basis for public sanction.”158 Stephen Kohn of the National
Whistleblower Center further articulated, “The right of every American citizen
to truthfully testify about criminal activities, including fraud in government
contracting, is a cornerstone to democracy.”159 The Supreme Court even
admits the importance of public employees disseminating information based on
their unique positions. “There is considerable value . . . in encouraging, rather
than inhibiting, speech by public employees. For ‘[g]overnment employees are
often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they
work.’”160 So much emphasis has been placed on the importance of a public
employee’s ability to speak out on important matters to combat negative
externalities being inflicted on the public, but the Court again falls short in
implementing these policy rationales.
Because of public employees’ intimate knowledge of the internal aspects
of governmental affairs, they have the ability to testify to ideas and information
that can hold the government accountable to the public.161 This is especially
true considering the recent influx of revelations of government corruption.162
However, when public employees hesitate to expose affairs of government and
cooperate with the prosecution to bring the perpetrators to justice, society bears

158. Brief for the First Amendment Coalition as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2,
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (No. 13-483).
159. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Rules Public Employees Are Protected from Retaliation
for Testimony, WASH. POST (June 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/supremecourt-rules-public-employees-are-protected-from-retaliation-for-testimony/2014/06/19/cd9df368f7bf-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html [http://perma.cc/7VMQ-4WQP]; see also Press
Release, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, supra note 134 (“It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court
didn’t go even further and establish a clear rule that truthful sworn testimony by public service
workers should never be the basis for any retaliatory action by a public employer. Public service
workers who are brave enough to stand up and speak out to improve public services should
always be protected from retaliation.”).
160. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 (2014) (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S.
661, 674 (1994)).
161. Howard L. Zwickel, In Support of an Implied State Constitutional Free Speech Tort in
Public Employment Retaliation Cases, 78 ALB. L. REV. 33, 34 (2015).
162. Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-C.I.A. Worker Says He Disclosed U.S.
Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2013, at A1, A13 (covering the National Security Agency
surveillance exposure by Edward Snowden); Emmarie Huetteman, Sentencing Set for Today for
Manning in Leaks Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2013, at A14 (covering the sentencing of Bradley
Manning who was behind the “WikiLeaks” scandal); Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, At VA Health
Facilities, Whistleblowers Still Fear Retaliation, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/at-va-health-facilities-whistleblowers-still-fear-retaliation/2015/03/05/a6
774bda-b944-11e4-9423-f3d0a1ec335c_story.html [http://perma.cc/47J2-YUF9] (covering the
VA hospital whistleblowers).
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the costs through the loss of potentially crucial information that can reform
government, promote efficiency, lead to greater transparency, and improve
peoples’ lives.163 It is ineffective to rely on another government actor, such as a
prosecutor, to issue a subpoena to procure a government employee’s testimony
on matters of public concern. Therefore, the Court should take its own policy
professions to heart164 and expand Lane’s holding to also protect public
employees testifying voluntarily from fear of job reprisals.
V. THE PROPOSAL: SIMPLIFY THE INQUIRY AND RETURN TO PICKERING’S
ROOTS
In addition to leaving the doctrine in a disheveled state, the Lane Court
missed the opportunity to simplify and correct the inquiry into whether a
public employee’s speech is covered by the First Amendment. The Court needs
to take a long look at its precedent, namely Garcetti, and correct the errors it
has made in unnecessarily narrowing the constitutional protection afforded to
public employees. To do this, I propose the Court revert to an inquiry similar
to that used in Pickering and discard the imaginative distinctions employed by
the Garcetti Court.165
First, I suggest the Court completely eliminate the peculiar distinction
between speech as an employee and speech as a citizen. This eradication
includes ridding the test of the “official duties” doctrine that focuses on
whether the speech is part of the employee’s ordinary job duties or not. Justice
Souter similarly stated:
Nor is there any reason to raise the counterintuitive question whether the
public interest in hearing informed employees evaporates when they speak as
required on some subject at the core of their jobs. . . . The interest at stake is as
much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s
own right to disseminate it. . . . This is not a whit less true when an employee’s
job duties require him to speak about such things: when, for example, a public
auditor speaks on his discovery of embezzlement of public funds, when a
building inspector makes an obligatory report of an attempt to bribe him, or
when a law enforcement officer expressly balks at a superior’s order to violate
constitutional rights he is sworn to protect. (The [Garcetti] majority, however,

163. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (“[P]ublic employees are often the
members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as to the operations of their
public employers, operations which are of substantial concern to the public. Were they not able to
speak on these matters, the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important
public issues.”).
164. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (“Exposing governmental
inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance.”).
165. Id. at 416, 444. These distinctions include the difference between speech as an employee
and speech as a citizen as well as distinguishing between speech if it is within the ordinary course
of an employee’s job duties or not. Id.
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places all these speakers beyond the reach of the First Amendment protection
against retaliation.) Nothing, then, accountable on the individual and public
side of the Pickering balance changes when an employee speaks “pursuant” to
166
public duties.

Therefore, the analysis should instead focus on whether the speech is on a
matter of public concern as the sole threshold question.167 If the speech
surpasses that simple inquiry, the Pickering balancing test should then be
applied. This balancing test depends on a careful balance “between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”168 If the
government cannot support its burden and adequately justify why the
employee should be treated differently based on its needs as an employer, the
public employee’s speech should be afforded protection by the First
Amendment.169
The proposed test is superior to the current doctrine for a number of
reasons. First and foremost, the proposed test is simple and straightforward. It
removes the ambiguous and confounding dichotomy of “employee speech”
versus “citizen speech.” It also eliminates the factual inquiry into what an
employee’s ordinary job duties entail and minimizes the opportunity for
employer manipulation in this regard.170 A test with a streamlined application
will aid lower courts, and reduce the confusion that is currently occurring and
has since the Garcetti decision.171 The test also provides better notice to
employees and employers alike of what conduct falls within constitutional
boundaries so they can adjust their behavior accordingly.172
In addition to the administrative justifications, the proposed test also more
effectively aligns with the Court’s own policy goals. With the ouster of many
of the threshold inquiries and heavier focus on the balancing of employee and
employer interests, the Court will have the opportunity to better promote its
166. Id. at 433 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
167. By removing this “pursuant to employment” threshold inquiry, at least when it comes to
situations involving testimony, a plethora of previously disqualified, yet likely valid, situations
then may proceed to the balancing test.
168. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
169. Brief for Alliance Defending Freedom as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3,
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (No. 13-483) (“A public employee should receive full
First Amendment protection when speaking on matters of public concern unless the employer can
demonstrate that such speech disrupts implementation of the employer’s business operations.”).
170. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter suggested employers,
in response to the Court’s decision in Garcetti, will be motivated to “expand stated job
descriptions to include more official duties and so exclude even some currently protectable
speech from First Amendment purview.” Id.
171. Fisk, supra note 6.
172. Baumgardner, supra note 7, at 52.
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own professed policy goals. The Court has routinely made statements like
“[t]he importance of public employee speech is especially evident in the
context of . . . a public corruption scandal,”173 but the application of current
doctrine has barred constitutional protection to public employees attempting to
expose corruption in the course of their job duties or through voluntary
testimony.174 This hypocrisy can be better avoided without the formalistic
distinctions employed in the current doctrine and a more personalized inquiry
into the situation at issue. While the proposed test may require more inquiry by
the Court into the interests at stake, it is worth it, even necessary, in order to
uphold the fundamental rights afforded to all citizens via the Constitution.175
While the current test is in need of immediate mending, the Court will be
unable to correct its errors until it grants certiorari to another case involving the
same issue. However, when presented with the next opportunity, the Court
should take a more policy-driven approach and entirely eliminate the “official
duties” doctrine established by Garcetti. Instead, the inquiry should be
centered on the importance of constitutional protection for public employees
speaking out against their employers on matters of public concern.176 While the
employer still has an “interest in controlling the operation of its
workplaces,”177 this interest can be protected sufficiently by applying the
Pickering balancing test. The proposed test protects both the interests of the
employee and the interests of the employer without making public employees
surrender their constitutional rights by way of their choice of employment.
CONCLUSION
While Lane v. Franks ultimately was decided correctly, the ruling was not
a total victory for free speech in the way that it could have been.178 The
Supreme Court erred in not going far enough in establishing new precedent
173. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014).
174. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413–24 (finding a district attorney who was retaliated against
after exposing governmental misconduct via a written memorandum was not protected by the
First Amendment because the memorandum was “pursuant to” his official job duties).
175. Id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen constitutionally significant interests clash,
resist the demand for winner-take-all; try to make adjustments that serve all of the values at
stake.”).
176. Hudson Jr., supra note 14, at 38; see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)
(The First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people”); Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377 (“Speech
by citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment . . . . This
remains true when speech concerns information related to or learned through public
employment.”).
177. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.
178. David L. Hudson Jr., Court Limits Garcetti—at Least a Little, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (July
8, 2014), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/court-limits-garcetti-at-least-a-little [http://perma.
cc/8T5Z-C69S].
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and protections for public employees. Thus, Lane is merely the first of no
doubt many decisions that will have to continue to clarify and refine Garcetti.
There are some duties that arise out of citizenship that are more important
than protecting a public employer’s interests. While there will certainly always
be limitations or circumstances in which the First Amendment should not bar
discipline by the employer, such as if the employee testifies falsely or
misleadingly, the interests of the employee and his or her duties as a citizen
should ascend the happenstance of their employer. The Lane Court was correct
in declaring the First Amendment protects testimony of a public employee on a
matter of public concern, which is not part of his or her job duties, from
governmental discipline. However, this was the perfect opportunity for the
Court to take a stance to further protect disadvantaged employees from their
powerful government employers. The constitutional rights of any United States
citizen should not be cast aside merely based on his or her public employment.
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